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COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE THEORY OF
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY FOR SERVING
ALCOHOL TO OBVIOUSLY INTOXICATED
GUESTS
Alcohol consumption and automobile driving have become part and parcel of mod-
ern life. When mixed, however, they are often fatal. In the past ten years, drunk drivers
have killed over 250,000 people and, indeed, over fifty percent of all highway deaths
involve the irresponsible use of alcohol.' Unfortunately, many of those killed were
innocent third persons. Heightened societal awareness and concern over the social costs
of alcohol related accidents has led to a public and judicial recognition for the need to
fully compensate victims of drunk driving. 2 Thus, in addition to the typical liability of
the drunk driver for injuries to a third person, recent cases have begun to extend liability
to the furnisher of the alcohol, such as a commercial vendor or social host. 3
Historically the injured third party had no cause of action against the furnisher of
the alcohol.' The judiciary's unwillingness to impose liability on individuals who furnish
alcohol to another who subsequently injures a third party is based on several underlying
principles. First among these principles is the belief that the consumption, and not the
furnishing of the alcohol, is the proximate cause of the injury. 5 Reasoning that a person
I PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
DRUNK DRIVING].
2 See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 551, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984).
3 Injured plaintiffs may seek recovery under a statute. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138
11 34, 69 (West Supp. 1984-85) (liquor control statute); N.Y. GEN. °BUG. LAW 11.01 (McKinney
& Supp. 1984-85) (dram shop act). See also infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text. In addition,
an injured plaintiff may also seek recovery under a common law negligence theory. See, e.g., Michnik-
Zilberman v. Gordon Liquors, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 538, 440 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (1982) (holding
retail liquor store owner liable), aff 'd, 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 43(1 (1983); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96
N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984) (holding social host liable); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625,
632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982) (holding liquor vendor liable); Baird v. Roach, 11 Ohio App. 3d
16, 19, 462 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (1983) (recognizing social host may be liable); Wiener v. Gamma
Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 639, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (recognizing
social host may be liable); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 438, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1982)
(recognizing social host may be liable); Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 88, 678 P.2d 1295,
1297 (1984) (recognizing social host may be liable); McClennan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411
(Wyo. 1983) (holding retail liquor store owner liable). See also infra notes 54-178 and accompanying
text.
Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir. 1982) (under common law social
host not liable), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983); Wienke v. Champaign County Grain Ass'n, 113
Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 447 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1983); Lowe v. Rubin, 98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 497,
424 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1981); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 598, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1047
(1981) (quoting Cunningham v. Brown, 22 111. 2d 23, 29-30, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1961)); Felder
v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 176, 438 A.2d 494, 495 (Md. App. 1981); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496,
500-01, 244 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1976); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
5 Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 5(18, 596 P.2c1 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Keaton v. Kroger
Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 27, 237 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1977); Miller v. Moran, 96 111. App. 3d 596, 598,
421 N.E.2d 1046, 1047 (1981) (quoting Cunningham v. Brown, 22 III. 2d 23, 29-30, 174 N.E.2d
153, 157 (1961)); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (1979); Holmes v. Circo,
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cannot become intoxicated unless he or she chooses to drink, courts traditionally held
the drunken driver, and not the furnisher of the alcohol, liable for the injuries to the
third person. 6 Second, courts reasoned that even if the act of furnishing the alcohol is
considered to be negligent, the intoxicated individual's negligent conduct is an interven-
ing, superseding cause of the injury.' Finally, the refusal to hold a furnisher of alcohol
liable has been justified on the basis that drunk or sober, individuals are responsible for
their own actions. 8
Over the course of many years, legislatures and courts began to limit this historical
rule of refusing to impose liability on the furnisher of alcohol. This erosion of the
nonliability rule has been gradual. The rule was first limited by legislative action. Statutes
were enacted which directly provided for an action against a liquor vendor for injuries
to innocent third persons. 9 In addition, legislative action was used indirectly to hold
vendors liable. For example, courts used criminal statutes that were enacted to regulate
the furnishing of alcohol to the public to impose a duty of care on the vendor. 10 In the
1950's, courts began to further limit this nonliability rule by imposing common law
negligence liability on vendors of alcohol."
196 Neb. 496, 501, 244 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1976); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 148, 470 A.2d 507,
510 (1983); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 486, 280 N.W2d 178, 179 (1979), overruled in
Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). For a discussion of the Sorenson
decision, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. See generally 45 Am. Jun. 2D Intoxicating
Liquors § 553 (1969).
For an action to be the proximate cause of an injury, the plaintiff must show that his or her
injury was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligence which was or should
have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant, and that but for the defendant's negligence, the
plaintiff would not have been injured. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS §1 41, 42 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Lewis v, Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 568, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), overruled in
Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983). The Ontiveros court overruled Lewis insofar
as it stood for the proposition that the negligence of a tavern owner in continuing to serve alcohol
to a patron who is intoxicated can never be the legal cause of a subsequent accident. Id. at 507-08,
667 P.2d at 207-08. See generally 45 Att. Jun. 2n Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1978).
in determining whether an event is an intervening, superseding cause, Prosser has stated:
[t]he question is always one of whether the defendant is to be relieved of responsibility,
and the defendant's liability superseded, by the subsequent event. In general, this has
been determined by asking whether the intervention of the later cause is a significant
part of the risk involved in the defendant's conduct, or is so reasonably connected
with it that the responsibility should not he terminated. It is therefore said that the
defendant is to be held liable if, but only if, the intervening cause is "foreseeable."
PROSSER, supra note 5, at 302.
8 Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 488-89, 280 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1979) (quoting Garcia v,
Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 736, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1970)), overruled in Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119
Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis, 2d 724, 736, 176 N.W.2d 566,
572 (1970), overruled in, Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). For a discussion
of the Sorenson decision, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
9 See Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused By the }Jets of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L.
REV. 445, 450-51 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Social Host Liability]. See also infra notes 28-34
and accompanying text.
Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Acts of An Intoxicated Guest, 16
WILLANtEr-rE L.J. 561, 570-71 (1980). See also infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982); McClennan v.
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 1983). See also infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text. The
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While recognition of liability for commercial vendors developed, courts'? and
legislatures' 3 were traditionally unwilling to extend such liability to social hosts. The
refusal to recognize such liability has been based mainly on policy considerations stem-
ming from the nature of home entertaining." In recent years, however, a significant
point in the gradual erosion of the historical rule of nonliability of social hosts has been
reached. Courts have held that social hosts may be liable under a general common law
negligence theory of recovery." For example, Washington courts have recognized an
exception to the nonliability rule for obviously intoxicated persons." The Washington
Court of Appeals has held that a social host may be liable for injuries proximately caused
by the guest if the guest is obviously intoxicated when served." Similarly, in the recent
and well publicized case of Kelly v. Gwinnell," the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a host who serves alcohol to a guest, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and will soon
be driving, is liable to a third person injured as a result of that guest's negligent driving.' 9
This note analyzes the imposition of common law negligence liability on social hosts.
Section I will examine the evolution of the historical rule of nonliability against furnishers
of alcohol. This section will examine the rationale given by courts for refusing to
recognize any cause of action against vendors and social hosts. It will then discuss the
limitation of the historical rule by state statutes and why courts have refused to rely on
this legislation as a theory of recovery to find social hosts liable. Section II will discuss
the trend toward abrogation of the traditional rule of nonliability for furnishers of
alcohol through the use of common law negligence principles. In Subsection A, cases
finding tavern keepers and retail liquor store owners liable under a negligence theory
will be analyzed. Subsection B will first review the traditional arguments for refusing to
extend such liability to social hosts. This subsection will then discuss the recent decisions
which have recognized common law negligence liability against social hosts. Finally,
traditional elements of a negligence cause of action would require that a plaintiff, in order to
recover for negligence in furnishing alcohol, show that: 1) the defendant furnished 2) alcohol 3)
to an individual the defendant knew or should have known was intoxicated 4) under such circum-
stances that a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have stopped serving
alcohol to the individual, 5) and that the defendant could reasonably foresee that the individual
would drive, 6) and the individual's mental or physical abilities became impaired as a result of the
consumption of the alcohol furnished by the defendant 7) so that such impairment was a proximate
cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Note, Injuries Arising From Negligence in Furnishing Liquor to
Minors and Intoxicated Adults: New Tort Action in Wyoming, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 285, 293 n.70
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Injuries in Furnishing Liquor]. For a similar discussion, see Cimino
v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 331 n.9, 431 N.E.2d 920, 926 n.9 (1982). For a discussion of
the traditional elements of a negligence cause of action, see PROSSER, supra note 5, at 164-65;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1969).
See, e.g., Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (1979) (refusing to find social
host liable under Montana law). See also infra notes 47, 88-94 and accompanying text.
' 3 Miller v. Owens, 48 111. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964) (no social host liability
under dram shop act); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 239, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973) (no social host
liability under liquor control statute). See also infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 95-173 and accompanying text.
' 8 Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 88, 678 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1984); see also infra notes 112-
133 and accompanying text.
'T Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 88, 678 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1984).
18 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
19 1d. at 548, 476 A.2(1 at 1224; see also infra notes 134-178 and accompanying text.
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Section III will analyze these recent decisions removing the traditional limitations placed
upon social host liability. This note will conclude that the adoption of a common law
negligence theory of recovery against social hosts is both desirable and workable.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE OF NONLIABILITY FOR FURNISHERS OF
ALCOHOL
Historically, neither vendors nor social hosts were held liable for injuries to a third
person resulting from furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated individual. This
historical rule was based on the view that the consumption of the alcohol was the
proximate cause of the injury 2" Under this traditional view of nonliability of furnishers
of alcohol, the act of furnishing alcohol in itself was harmless because the individual's
drunkenness and subsequent negligent driving resulted from drinking the alcohol." The
drunk driver was, therefore, held solely responsible for the injury.
The historical common law rule of nonliability for furnishers of alcohol was further
based on several public policy considerations. One such consideration was the view that
individuals are responsible for their own actions, regardless of whether they are drunk
or sober. 22 Another basis for the historical rule that a furnisher of alcohol was not liable
for injuries to a third person was that even if the act of furnishing was negligent, the
drunk individual's negligent driving was a superseding cause of the injury, so as to cut
off the furnisher's liability. 23
 The drunk driver's negligence was, therefore, viewed as an
unforeseeable consequence of furnishing alcohol to an already intoxicated individual. 24
Courts have also based their refusal to impose common law liability on furnishers
of alcohol on the argument that the issue of liability is best left to the legislature." Courts
have reasoned that the potential liability under a common law negligence theory would
place an unwarranted heavy burden on furnishers of alcohol. 26
 Noting that statutes
which have imposed liability on vendors of alcohol generally limit the amount recoverable
against the furnisher of alcohol, courts resisted creating a common law negligence cause
of action which would lead to unlimited liability for these parties."
20 See supra note 5.
21 Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 568, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), overruled in
Ontiveros v. liorak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983). For a discussion of the Ontiveros court's
overruling of Lewis, see supra note 6. See generally 45 Am. JuR. 2u Intoxicating Liquors § 533 (1969).
22 Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 736, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1970), overruled in Sorenson
v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). For a discussion of Sorenson, see infra notes 79-
81 and accompanying text.
23 Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.24 268, 271 (Tenn. 1978).
24 See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 303-06.
2 ' See, e.g., Wright. v. Moffitt, 437 A.2ci 554, 556 (Del. 1981); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496,
505, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City Nuggctt, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d
358, 359 (1969). See infra note 94 for cases expressing the view that the decision to impose liability
on social hosts should be left to the legislature.
2" Wienke v. Champaign COMIC,' Grain Ass'n, 113 ill. App. 3d 1005, 1007, 447 N.E.2d 1388,
1391 (1983). The Wienke court asserted that "[Ole imposition of fa common law tort remedy] would
impose a heavy burden upon those who serve liquor to others or who aid others who may be
intoxicated in getting to their automobiles." Id. See also Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 490,
280 N.W.2d 178, 18! (1979).
27 Wienke, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 1006-07, 447 N.E.2d at 1389; Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d
596, 601, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981).
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While courts in the past were reluctant to hold any furnisher of alcohol liable to an
injured third party, this historical common law rule was abrogated by statute in certain
limited circumstances. In some states, liquor vendors are held liable under dram shop
acts, which provide for an action against a vendor for injuries to a third person."
Originally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century as a response to prohibitionists'
lobbying, these statutes were designed to control liquor traffic and mitigate "the evils of
intoxicating liquors." 29 A suit based on a dram shop act is neither a common law
negligence action, nor a criminal prosecution. Rather, it is a statutory tort action." In
order to recover against a vendor under a dram shop act, a plaintiff must prove that
liquor was supplied in violation of the statute,31 that the intoxicated person consumed
the alcohol, and that the alcohol contributed to the intoxication." In addition, the
plaintiff must show causation between the intoxication and the injury." The civil liability
imposed by such a statute is strict; therefore no showing of negligence is necessary to
recover against the furnisher. 94
Some states have broadly worded dram shop acts that provide for liability against
anyone who sells or gives liquor to a minor or an obviously intoxicated individual. 35
Relying on the broad language of such statutes, certain courts extended liability under
the dram shop act to social hosts." These courts found that the statutes were compen-
satory in nature, and, thus, social hosts as well as vendors should be liable. 97 The
legislatures of these states, however, responded to this judicial extension of liability by
28 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975). An example of
such an act is the Alabama statute, which states in pertinent part:
(a) Every wife, child, parent or other person who shall be injured in person, property
or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication
of any person shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by selling,
giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any
liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person for all damages actually
sustained, as well as exemplary damages.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (1975). Fourteen states currently have such dram shop acts in effect. See
Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 9, at 446 11.10.
Luckman, Liquor Law f irability — Commercial Vendors and Social Hosts, 53 CONN. B.J. 132, 133
(1979). See also Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, 176-
77 (1958).
" See Luckman, supra note 29, at 133.
3 ' Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 9, at 450-51.
" Id. at 451.
ss
34 See Graham, supra note 10, at 564.
35 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975). See supra note 28 for text of statute.
36 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972); IOWA Cons: ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949); see Williams
v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615-16 (lowa 1972) (statute affords right of action against those
not engaged in liquor traffic), overruled in Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 18i (Iowa 1977); Ross v. Ross,
294 Minn. 115, 121-22, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1972).
The Lewis court overruled Williams to the extent that it was inconsistent with the recognition
of a common law right to recovery. Lewis, 256 N.W.2d at 191-92.
37 Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 615-16; Ross, 294 Minn. at 120-21. 200 N.W.2d at 152-53. The
Ross court, in holding that the legislature intended to create a cause of action against anyone
violating the liquor laws, stated that "no reason occurs to us why those who furnish liquor to others,
even on social occasions, should not be responsible for protecting innocent third persons from the
potential dangers of indiscriminately furnishing such hospitality." Id. at 121-22, 200 N.W.2d at
153.
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amending their statutes to make it clear that the dram shop acts were to apply only to
persons who sell alcohol." In other states with broadly worded dram shop acts, courts
have refused to extend statutory liability to social hosts. 3  Reasoning that dram shop acts
are penal in character, and require strict construction; 1" these courts found that the
legislatures did not intend to impose liability on social hosts." Thus, while a judicial
attempt was made to construe broadly worded dram shop acts, to impose liability on
social hosts, such a theory of recovery was not accepted as a viable limitation upon the
historical nonliahility rule.
Courts have also relied on liquor control statutes to impose civil liability on liquor
vendors for injuries to a third person.42 These statutes regulate the furnishing of alcohol
to the public, typically by prohibiting sale to minors, intoxicated persons, or other high
risk individuals:13 Violations of these statutes are typically treated as criminal misde-
meanor offenses." In construing these statutes to impose civil liability, courts have looked
to the legislature's broad intent to protect the general public, and have reasoned that
imposing a duty of care on a furnisher of alcohol is consistent with that legislative
intent. 43 Although a few courts have used this reasoning to hold social hosts civilly liable
under these statutes,46 most courts which have considered this issue have restricted
liability under liquor control statutes to commercial vendors.42 Therefore, liability under
18 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1982). The pertinent part of the statute provides:
"Every ... person who is injured . . . by an intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person,
has a right of action . against any person who, by illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors
, caused the intoxication of that person, for all damages sustained ...." Id. In 1972, the Iowa
legislature also amended its drain shop act allowing a cause of action to be brought only against a
licensee or permittee selling or giving liquor.
New York courts, for example, have refused to extend liability to social hosts under a broadly
worded dram shop act. See Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 857-58, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 102, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
Likewise, courts in Illinois, which has a broadly worded dram shop act, have also refused to extend
liability to social hosts. See Miller v. Owens, 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964).
In Miller v. Owens, the court stated that the legislature did not intend to make social drinking and
giving of drinks to others by social hosts actionable under the dram shop act. Id. If such was the
law, the court stated, a social drink with a neighbor or friend would become a hazardous act. Id.
According to the Illinois court, this view of social host liability would open up the floodgates of
litigation as to almost every happening where someone was injured. Id.
41 Miller v. Owens, 48 III. App. 2d at 420, 199 N.E.2d at 305; Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d at 103,
375 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
4 ' Miller v, Owens, 48 Ill. App. 2d at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306; Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d at 103,
375 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
42 Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ono v. Applegate,
612 P.2d 533, 539 (Hawaii 1980).
" See, e.g., N.D. CENT. Cons: § 5-01-09 (1975), which provides in part: "Any person delivering
alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an habitual drunkard, an incom-
petent, or an intoxicated person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor ...." Id. All states and the
District of Columbia have adopted liquor control statutes. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note
9, at 447 n.12.
" Graham, supra note 10, at 570.
45
 Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262, 263-64 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Coulter v. Superior Court
of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 151-52, 577 P.2d 669, 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (1978);
Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 673-74, 309 N.E.2d 150, 156 (1974).
" Giardina, 360 F. Supp. at 263-64; Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 538; Brattain, 159 Ind. App. at 674, 309 N.E.2d at 156.
47 See•Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103-04, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975);
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liquor control statutes, like dram shop acts, has not been viewed as a viable theory of
recovery against social hosts.
A few states have enacted statutes which specifically deal with civil liability of social
hosts for serving alcohol to an intoxicated guest." In 1979, the Oregon legislature
statutorily defined the specific situations that may give rise to social host liability. 49 In
addition to a section dealing with serving alcohol to minors,5° the Oregon legislation
states that a social host will not be liable unless the host served or provided alcohol to a
visibly intoxicated guest." A recently enacted New Mexico statute provides that no social
host will be liable unless the liquor was served recklessly in disregard of the rights of
others. 32
Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 239, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973) (per curiam). In Manning the per
curiam opinion stated simply, "lolnly licensed persons engaged in the sale of intoxicants have been
held to be civilly liable to injured parties." Id. In a concurrence, Justice.Pomeroy stated:
I hasten to add that in my view there is no reason in the nature of things why a private
person should not be held liable if he serves liquor to one whom he knows or should
know to be intoxicated, and who he knows or should know is about to drive an
automobile or engage in some other activity involving the potentiality of harm to
himself or to others, with resulting damage. No legislative enactment is required to
accomplish that result; it is ordinary tort law.
Id. at 242, 310 A.2d at 77.
Some recent court decisions, however, have held a social host civilly liable under a liquor control
statute for serving alcohol to a minor. See Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 674, 309 N.E.2d
150, 156 (1974); Longstreth v. FitzGibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 266, 335 N.W.2d 677, 679-80
(1983); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 162-63, 470 A.2d 515, 518 (1983); Koback
v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Wis. 1985). In Congini, the court noted that legislation dealing with
serving to a minor and with a minor purchasing alcohol represents an obvious legislative decision
to protect both minors and the public at large from the perceived deleterious effects of serving
alcohol to persons under twenty-one years of age. 504 Pa. at 162, 470 A.2d at 518. See also Sutter
v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985). In Sutter, the court held that the hostess owed a
duty to those using the highways not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing
alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated minor who the hostess knew would soon be driving. Id.
48 Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b), (c) (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(D)
(1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.955, .960 (1983). In 1978, the California legislature codified the
traditional rule that the drinking, and not the furnishing of the alcohol, is the proximate cause of
any resulting injury. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985). No vendor or social
host, therefore, can be held civilly liable for injuries caused by the intoxicated individual. Id. at
§ 25602(6). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430,
439-41, 629 P.2d 8, 13-14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505-06 (1981). The Cory court found that the
legislature might have reasonably assumed that imposing sole responsibility on the drunk driver
would encourage a sense of responsibility in the driver for his acts, ultimately reducing the frequency
of injuries caused by alcohol. Id. at 440, 629 P.2d at 13, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
49 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.955, 30.960 (1983).
S0
 Id. § 30.960. That section provides in pertinent part:
[N]o .. social host shall be liable to third persons injured by or through persons not
having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic beverages from the licensee,
permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated that a reasonable person would have
determined that identification should have been requested or that the identification
exhibited was altered or did not accurately describe the person to whom the alcoholic
liquor was sold or served.
Id.
Si Id. § 30.955. That section provides in full: "No private host is liable for damages incurred or
caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the private host has served or provided alcoholic
beverages to a social guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated.' Id.
52 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(D) (1984). That section provides:
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Although the historical nonliability rule has been limited to some extent by legisla-
tion, that legislation has covered only certain circumstances and generally has been
narrowly construed by the courts. While this legislation serves as a limited method by
which individuals injured by drunk drivers can recover against the furnisher of the
alcohol, courts have generally refused to employ these statutes to impose a common law
negligence cause of action against vendors or social hosts."
II. RECOGNITION OF A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
I'URNISHERS OF ALCOHOL
While some courts continue to adhere to the historical rule of nonliability, others
began in the late 1950's to reject the traditional rule of nonliability for furnishers of
alcohol and to recognize a common law negligence cause of action against these parties:"
The courts which have recognized such a cause of action are no longer relying on statutes
for extending a remedy to an injured third party. The impetus for the imposition of
common law negligence liability on furnishers of alcohol has been the recognition that
the furnishing of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person is the proximate cause of a
resulting injury."
The erosion of the historical nonliability rule is an evolutionary process which is still
developing. While courts began in the 1950's to impose negligence liability on commercial
vendors of alcohol," the judiciary continued in its refusal to impose such liability on
social hosts. Only recently have courts in a few jurisdictions extended a common law
negligence cause of action to social hosts. 5 ' Subsection A examines the imposition of
common law negligence liability on commercial vendors. Subsection B discusses the
recent extension of a common law negligence cause of action to social hosts.
A. Commercial Vendors
In the late 1950's, courts began to recognize a common law negligence cause of
action against one class of liquor vendors, tavern keepers. In holding that tavern keepers
could be liable to injured third parties under a negligence theory, courts rejected the
main justification for the traditional rule of nonliability — that the drinking, and not
the furnishing of the alcohol, was the proximate cause of the resulting injury." In
reaching this result, courts reasoned that, with the increasing frequency of accidents
involving drunk driving, the consequences of serving alcohol to an intoxicated person
No person who has gratuitously provided alcoholic beverages to a guest in a social
setting may be held liable in damages to any person for bodily injury, death or property
damage arising from the intoxication of the social guest unless the alcoholic beverages
were provided recklessly in disregard of the rights of others, including the social guest.
Id.
" See Graham, supra note 10, at 577.
54 See infra notes 58-85 and accompanying text. See generally 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 428
(1981).
" See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
56 See Luckman, supra note 29, at 138.
67 See infra notes 95-173 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 5-6 and accompanying text.
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whom the server knows will be driving a car are reasonably foreseeable." Noting that
the serious danger to the public posed by drunk drivers was not present when the
traditional rule of nonliability was developed and society's main mode of transportation
was horse and buggy, courts have stated that the law must be adjusted to reflect changes
in society. 60 In the age of the automobile, therefore, courts held that the serving of
alcohol can be the proximate cause of injuries resulting from drunk driving.6 ' As in any
other negligence case, courts have held that a tavern keeper is under a duty to use
reasonable care to avoid creating situations that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.62 As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Alegria v. Payonk, there is no justification
for excusing a vendor from this general duty which each person owes all others in
society. 65
In rejecting the traditional nonliability of tavern keepers, courts were also faced
with the contention that the issue of whether to recognize a negligence cause of action
against commercial vendors is best left to the legislature. 64 In responding to this argu-
ment, courts have noted that since the historical rule was judicially created, it is within
the province of the courts to alter it when it becomes unsound. 65 For example, in the
recent case of McClennan v. Totter-duff, the Wyoming Supreme Court asserted that "
several courts have bemoaned the fact that an injured third person had no cause of
w Elsperman v. Plump, _Ind. App. _, 446 N.E.2d 1{}27, 1030 (1983); Adamian v. Three Sons,
Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501, 233 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1968); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 1'.2d 1269, 1276 (1982).
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge:
The first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because or alcohol, lost control
over his reflexes, judgment and sense of responsibility to others, is to stop pouring
alcohol into him. This is a duty which everyone owes to society and to law entirely
apart from any statute. The person who would put into the hands of an obviously
demented individual a firearm with which he shot an innocent third person would be
amenable in damages to that third person for unlawful negligence. An intoxicated
person behind the wheel of an automobile can be as dangerous as an insane person
with a firearm. He is as much a hazard to the safety of the community as a stick of
dynamite that must be de-fused in order to be rendered harmless. To serve an
intoxicated person more liquor is to light the fuse.
413 Pa. 626, 631-32, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964).
6° Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., 463 So. 2d 121, 125-26 (Ala. 1984); Lopez v. Maez,
98 N.M. 625, 629, 651 P.2d 1269, 1273 (1982). The Buchanan court noted that "Itloday, lounge
patrons no longer typically walk or rely on horses to travel to and from taverns. They almost always
travel by motor vehicle." Id. at 125. See also Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759,
767, 458 P.2d 897, 901-02 (1969) (Finley, J., dissenting).
Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (I). Alaska 1973) (majority view is that the
furnishing of the alcohol is the proximate cause of the injury); Buchanan, 463 So. 2d at 125-26.
62 See Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500,
508, 667 P.2d 200, 208-09 (1983); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137
(1980); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 573-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); McClennan v. Tottenhoff,
666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo. 1983) ("cases involving vendors of liquor and injured third parties will be
approached in the same manner as other negligence cases").
Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619, 619 P.2d at 137.
64 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
63 Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 630, 651 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1982); HalvorSon v. Birchfield Boiler,
Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 767-68, 458 P.2d 897, 902 (1969) (Finley, J., dissenting); Garcia v. Hargrove,
46 Wis. 2d 724, 731, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1970), overruled in Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
350 N.W.2d 119 (1984) (court decided on other grounds not to change rule).
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action, even though they have continued to defer to the legislature. We do not choose
to stand by and wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves have created.""
In addition to tavern keepers, courts have recently begun to impose liability under
a common law negligence theory on another type of liquor vendor — retail liquor store
owners. 67 Unlike tavern keepers, retail liquor store owners do not have contact with an
individual each time he or she takes another drink. This distinction has been asserted
as a basis for refusing to hold retail liquor store owners liable. 6s In Michnik -Zilberrnan v.
Gordon's Liquor, however, the Massachusetts Appeals Court stated that the argument that
retailers have no control over the consumption of alcohol ignores the fact that the
furnishing, rather than the consumption of the alcohol, may be found to constitute
negligence.69 The Michnik -Zilbernign court further noted that there is no distinction
between tavern keepers and retail sellers which requires taking the question of foresee-
ability from the jury when the sale is by a retail seller." In Michnik-Zilberman, Gordon
negligently sold beer to a minor who, as a result of drinking the beer, negligently drove
his car, striking and injuring the plaintiff's husband. 7 ' In determining the liability of the
liquor store owner, the court noted that, while a statutory violation of selling alcohol to
a minor serves as some evidence of negligence, liability in cases dealing with furnishers
of alcohol are grounded on the common law doctrine of negligence. 72 The court thus
held that liquor store owners, like tavern keepers, have a duty to refuse to sell alcohol
to persons they know or reasonably should know are intoxicated."
Similarly, in the 1984 case of Sorenson v. Jarvis," the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the historical common law rule of nonliability was wholly abrogated. In Sorenson, a
liquor dealer negligently sold alcohol to a minor." Twenty minutes later he returned
and purchased another bottle of liquor. 76 Later that evening the minor injured two
children and killed their parents when he failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with
their car." In an action brought against the minor and the liquor store, 78 the Sorenson
court expressly overruled cases which have held that the act of selling is too remote to
be a proximate cause of an injury." Noting that the chain of causation between the
furnishing of alcohol, driving while intoxicated, and the resulting injuries was a routine
causation question, 8° the court held that a liquor retailer could be liable under a common
law negligence action. 8 '
66 McClennan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 415 (Wyo. 1983).
67
 Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon Liquors, Inc., 14 Mass. App. 533, 539-40, 440 N.E.2d 1297,
1301-02 (1982), aff'd, 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983); Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
646, 350 N.W.2d 108, 118 (1984).
6" Michnih-abernzan, 14 Mass. App. at 539, 440 N.E.2d at 1301.
69 Id.
70 Id. The Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's decision for the plaintiff. Id. at 543, 440
N.E.2d at 1303.
7 ' Id. at 534, 440 N.E.2d at 1298.
72 Id. at 537, 440 N.E.2d at 1300.
" Id. at 538, 440 N.E.2d at 1301.
74 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).




" Id. at 640 n.10, 350 N.W.2d at 115 n.10..
"" Id. at 643, 350 N.W.2d at 116.
gl Id. at 646, 350 N.W.2d at 118.
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Thus, while some courts still adhere to the historical nonliability rule, a majority of
jurisdictions now recognize common law negligence liability against tavern keepers or
retail liquor store owners." These courts express the emerging view that the serving of
alcohol is recognized as a proximate cause of injuries resulting from drunk driving."
Moreover, they have explicitly or implicitly rejected the argument that the issue of liability
for furnishers of alcohol is best left to the legislature." Extending liability to retail liquor
store owners demonstrates the courts' concern with the control of the liquor supply, and
not control over the consumption."
B. Social Hosts
Despite the widespread recognition of a common law negligence theory in deter-
mining the liability of liquor vendors, courts in the past have refused to extend the
reasoning expressed in the cases concerning liquor vendors to social hosts." These courts
have largely relied on policy considerations to distinguish furnishing alcohol commer-
cially from furnishing alcohol in a social setting. 87 Imposing liability on social hosts,
courts contended, involved a myriad of practical and policy concerns. It has been stated
that if social host liability were imposed, simply having a drink with a neighbor or friend
would become a dangerous act." Courts have also expressed the concern that potentially
every social gathering could give rise to liability. 88 Practical problems in determining an
individual's level of intoxication have also been the basis for a refusal to recognize a
common law cause of action against a social host. Accordingly, courts have pointed out
that a vendor is in a better position to monitor an individual's level of intoxication
because the patron must have some contact with the bartender or server each time
another drink is ordered.9° Social hosts, on the other hand, do not have the same control
over the supply of alcohol because guests often serve each other." A related concern
regarding the atmosphere of social gatherings is that a great deal of social pressure is
involved in policing the activities of friends.92 Moreover, courts have noted that, since
the injured party can always sue the drunk driver, the imposition of liability on social
hosts cannot be characterized as necessary to provide adequate remedies for an injured
" 
Nazareno v. Uric, 638 P.2d 671, 674 n.3 (Alaska 1981). The Nazarene court listed the following
jurisdictions as imposing liability on bar owners: Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Washington. Id, Since the Nazarene decision, the following jurisdictions have recognized liability
against commercial vendors: Alabama, Alaska, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
" See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 69, 80 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
" Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964).
" Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103-04, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2cl 145, 147 (1979); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,
566, 476 A.2d 1219, 1234 (1984) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); cf. Edgar, 84 Misc. 2d at 1003, 375
N.Y.S.2d at 552 (social host unable to supervise guest's activities).
" Kelly, 06 N.J. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
92 Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 734, 176 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1970), overruled in Sorenson
v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984); see also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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person." Many courts have stated that the issue of social host liability is, therefore, best
left to the legislature.94
However, since 1971, when the first case to recognize a common law negligence
cause of action against a social host was decided," several jurisdictions have recognized
such liability. 96
 Most of these' recent decisions have struggled with the same dilemma.
Each one recognized that the furnishing of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person,
whether by a vendor or social host, can be the proximate cause of a resulting injury. At
the same time, however, these courts seemed reluctant to definitively reject the historical
rule of nonliability, and instead stated its holding as an exception to that rule.
The first case which recognized social host liability under a common law negligence
theory was Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity. 97 In Wiener, a
minor was served a large quantity of beer at a college fraternity party, and while driving
from the party was involved in an accident which injured the plaintiff." The Oregon
Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances, a host may have a duty to deny
a guest further access to alcohol. 99
 The court stated that the duty to refuse further
alcohol would arise if the host knew that the individual's characteristics, such as youth
nr severe intoxication, make it likely that he or she will ac: unreasonahly."") Finding that
Lowe v. Rubin, 98 III. App. 3d 496, 498, 424 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1981) (quoting Miller v.
Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981)); Miller v. Moran, 96 III. App. 3d
596, 601, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981).
9,
 See, e.g., Cartwright v. Hyatt, 960 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1978); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill.
App. 3d 596, 601, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145,
147 (1979); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 458 P.2d. 897, 900 (1969).
9' Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 985 P.2d 18
(1971).
96 Kelly v. Cwinnell, 96 NJ. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984); Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.j.
Super. 477, 980, 449 A.2d 564, 565 (1982); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 220, 356 A.2d 15,
19 (1976); Baird v. Roach, 11 Ohio App. 3d 16, 19, 462 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (1983); Wilson v.
Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 438, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1982); Halligan v. I'upo, 37 Wash. App.
84, 88, 678 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1984). See also infra notes 104-73 and accompanying text.
9' 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
98 Id. at 636-37, 485 P.2d at 20.
99 Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21. The court stated that "[a] host may have the responsibility under
certain circumstances to prevent a guest from voluntarily making himself a hazard to himself and
others." Id. at 641-42, 485 P.2d at 22.
'00 Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21. Similarly, in Coulter a. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal.
3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), the California Supreme Court found that a cause
of action may arise against a social host under general negligence principles. Id. at 149-50, 577
P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently
served an individual extremely large quantities of alcohol, and that the defendant's should have
known that their conduct would expose third persons to "foreseeable serious risk of injury." Id. at
148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536. The court noted that under a common law negligence
theory, a host, like a vendor, owes a duty to the general public to refuse to furnish alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated person if, under the circumstances, that person constitutes a reasonably
foreseeable danger to a third person. Id. at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The
court further noted that:
it is small comfort to the widow whose husband has been killed in an accident involving
an intoxicated driver to learn that the driver received his drinks from a hospitable
social host rather than by purchase at a bar .... The danger and risk to the potential
victim on the highway is equally as great, regardless of the source of the liquor.
Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
The Coulter court also stated that there arc many outward manifestations of intoxication which
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the facts of Wiener were sufficient to raise that duty,'°' the court reversed a summary
judgment for the defendant and remanded for tria1.'° 2 Although the 1979 Oregon
legislation limited the Wiener decision by statutorily defining the situations which give
rise to liability,'" the decision was a significant development in the area of liability against
social hosts.
In spite of the ground breaking lead of Wiener, it was not until 1982 that several
other jurisdictions suggested that a social host may be liable under a common law
negligence theory. In the 1983 case of Baird v. Roach,'" the Ohio Appellate Court
addressed the issue of whether a social host may be held liable under a negligence theory.
While not definitively rejecting the historical limitations on social host liability, the Ohio
court in Baird recognized that the liability of vendors and social hosts should not be
distinguished, and that the proximate cause issue in either case should be left to the
jury.'" In Baird two employees attended their employer's annual picnic where they were
served alcohol and became intoxicated. 106 They left the party driving their cars, and
while drag racing one or both went left of center and collided with another car, injuring
the plaintiff.'" The Baird court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the
issue of proximate cause is properly left to the jury in a case dealing with a common law
negligence cause of action against a vendor.'" Although the Baird court determined that
the complaint did not allege sufficient circumstances to impose liability," it reasoned
that liability could be imposed on a social host if the host knew that the furnished alcohol
would be consumed by the guest, that the guest was or would become intoxicated,"° and
that the guest would act so as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons."'
Unlike the Ohio court in Baird, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that liability for serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person is an "exception" to
the historical rule of nonliability. 112 This exception was announced in Wilson v. Stein-
social hosts can easily recognize. Id. at 155, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540. Imposing liability
on a social host when a guest is "obviously intoxicated," therefore, is not too subjective a standard.
Id. The California legislature expressly abrogated the Coulter decision in 1978. See supra note 48.
Lot Wiener, 258 Or. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
102 Id.
' 03 See Ott. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983), discussed supra note 51 and accompanying text (social
host liable for serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated person); Id. § 30.960, discussed supra note
50 and accompanying text (social host liable to third parties injured by minor who obtained alcohol
from social host).
'°4 11 Ohio App. 3d 16, 462 N.E.2d 1229 (1983).
105
 Id. at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233.
Id. at 16, 462 N.E.2d at 1230.
'° Id.
1 " 6 Id. at 18-19, 462 N.E.2d at 1232-33. The Baird court found that there was no clear Ohio
authority on whether a social host could be held liable. Id. at 18, 462 N.E.2d at 1232. The court
recognized, however, that other jurisdictions have extended the reasoning of vendor cases to hold
social hosts liable. Id. at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233.
Id. The plaintiffs in this case did not even allege that the individuals who were drag racing
were intoxicated. Id. Since the court in Baird did not reach the merits of this case, it based its
holding on the lalssurn[ption] that the gratuitous serving of liquor to a social or business guest can
give rise to liability on the part of the host under Ohio law ...." Id.
"0 1d.
"' Id.
1 ' 2 Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 438, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1982). This case interpreted
an earlier Washington case, Halvorson v. Birchfield, 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969), as
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bach, 115
 in which a minor plaintiff consumed an undetermined amount of alcohol at a
party hosted by the defendants. 114 After leaving the party, the plaintiff was killed when
she lost control of her car and struck a utility pole. 115 The plaintiff's estate sued the
host. 16 Although the plaintiff was the drunk driver, and not an innocent third person,
the Wilson court stated that the identification of the injured party is irrelevant in deter-
mining the duty owed by the host." 7 Instead, the relevant inquiry, the court noted, is
whether the standard of care was observed or breached by the host. 119 The court
indicated that an exception to the historical rule existed for furnishing alcohol to ob-
viously intoxicated persons, persons in a state of helplessness, or persons in a special
relationship to the furnisher of alcohol. 119 In the facts of this case, however, the defen-
dants were granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
recognizing an exception to the traditional common law rule of nonliability when the person served
was obviously intoxicated. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. In holding that no common
law negligence action existed, the Halvorson court cited authority which stated that "there can be
no cause of action so long as the person to whom the liquor was sold or given was not in such
a state of helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of his willpower or responsibility for his
behavior." 76 Wash. 2d at 762, 458 P.2d at 899 (citing 30 Ass. JUR. 521 Intoxicating Liquors (1958)).
It is the inclusion of this quotation which has beets relied upon by later courts, which interpreted
it as a recognition of an exception to the rule of nonliability. The Halvorson court, however, noted
that any decision about liability should be left to the legislature, stating:
It may be that the social and economic consequences of "mixing gasoline and liquor"
should lead to a rule of accountability by those who furnish intoxicants to one who
becomes a tort-feasor by reason of intoxication, but such a policy decision should be
made by the legislature after full investigation, debate and examination of the relative
merits of the conflicting positions.
76 Wash. 2d at 765, 458 P.2d at 900.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Kowa] v. Hohfer, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1
(1980), attempted to adhere to the historical rule of nonliability while creating an exception for
wanton and reckless conduct. In Kowal, the court dealt with the question of whether the policy
considerations that justify immunizing vendors and social hosts from common law liability for
negligent conduct also apply when the conduct is wanton and reckless. Id. at 360, 436 A.2d at 3.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant served alcohol to the driver when the driver
was already in an intoxicated condition. Id. at 356, 436 A.2d at 1. The driver later collided with
the plaintiff's car, injuring the plaintiff. Id. The court held that liability for wanton and reckless
conduct may exist. Id. at 362, 436 A.2d at 4. The Kowal court indicated that as a matter of policy,
an individual should bear a gi-eater responsibility when acting wantonly or recklessly than when
acting merely negligently. Id. at 361-62, 436 A.2d at 4. Although the facts of the case involved a
restaurant owner serving to an obviously intoxicated person, id. at 356, 436 A.2d at 1, the court's
holding is worded so as to apply equally to vendors and social hosts. Id. at 360-61, 436 A.2d at 3.
While the court did recognize that a problem exists, and that vendors and social hosts should be
treated in the same manner to alleviate the problem, the court's reasoning did not demonstrate
how the historical rule and the rule as enunciated by the court can coexist.
113 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
" 4 1d. at 436, 656 P.2d at 1031.
1 ' 5 Id.
" 6 Id.
" 7 Id. at 439, 656 P.2d at 1033.
" 5 1d, at 440, 656 P.2d at 1033.
1
'" Id. at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032. The Wilson court noted that such an exception to the traditional
rule of nonliability was recognized in Halvorson. Id.
Similarly, in Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983), the Washington
Supreme Court relied on the same interpretation of Halvorson to hold that a negligence cause of
action existed against a commercial vendor. Id, at 657-58, 663 P.2d at 836.
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guest was obviously intoxicated while at the hosts' home.'" According to the Washington
court, the fact that the guest was a minor had no hearing on the court's decision; the
crucial question was whether the guest was obviously intoxicated when served alcohol. 121
The court further noted that the guest's intoxication is to be judged by the way she
appeared to those around her and not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently
revea1. 122
The exception to the historical rule of nonliability that was first established in Wilson
was most recently applied by the Washington Appeals Court in Halligan v. Pupo.'" In
that case, an employee of the defendant attended the defendant's Christmas party.' 24
The party featured an open bar tended by two bartenders hired for the occasion.1 25
Wine was continuously available at each table. 126 The plaintiff alleged that the employee/
guest drank an undetermined amount of alcohol until it became obvious that he was
intoxicated.'" He then left the party and shortly thereafter was involved in a car accident,
in which he injured the plaintiff.' 28 The Washington Court of Appeals stated that the
key to this cause of action was the guest's obvious intoxication. 129 The court held,
12" Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 438-39, 656 P.2d at 1032-33.
121 Id.
122 Id. In Dickinson v. Edwards, 37 Wash. App. 834, 682 P.2d 971 (1984), the Washington Court
of Appeals relied on this statement in Wilson to affirm the trial court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of a host. Id. at 839, 682 P.2d at 973. In Dickinson, the guest consumed eight to
ten hard liquor drinks and a glass of champagne at a banquet sponsored by his employer. Id. at
836, 682 P.2d at 972. After leaving the party, the guest drove the wrong way on a one-way ramp
and had a head-on collision with the plaintiff's motorcycle. Id. The court noted that the only
evidence of the guest's condition was his own admissions as to the number of drinks he consumed,
and the investigating officer's observations that the guest was obviously intoxicated at the accident
site approximately five minutes after he left the banquet. Id. at 839, 682 P.2d at 972, 973. The
officer further reported that the guest had a .17 percent blood alcohol level an hour after the
accident. Id. at 836, 682 P.2d at 972. The court noted that there were no statements as to how the
guest appeared to others attending the banquet. Id. at 839, 682 P.2d at 973. The court concluded
that there was no material question of fact, therefore, relating to the guest's conduct at the banquet
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he appeared "obviously intoxicated" to those
who served him. Id.
A case which the Wilson court relied on for the conclusion that the guest's intoxication is to
judged by the way she appeared to those around her and not by what a blood alcohol test may
subsequently reveal is distinguishable from the instant case. In Barrie v. Hosts of America, 94 Wash.
2d 640, 618 P.2d 96 (1980), the court noted that two hours had elapsed between the time the
consumer was last observed and the time of death, and there was no evidence as to whether he had
consumed alcohol elsewhere. Id. at 643 n.1, 618 P.2d at 643 n.l.
In Wilson, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant hosts because the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the guest was obviously intoxicated or in a helpless condition while at the
host's home. 98 Wash. 2d at 439, 656 P.2d at 1033.
123 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295 (1984).
124 Id. at 85, 678 P.2d at 1296.
In Id.
156 id.
127 Id. at 85-86, 678 P.2d at 1296.
12'1 1d. at 86, 678 P.2d at 1296. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the sponsors of the party
were negligent by continuing to furnish alcohol to the guest despite his state of obvious intoxication.
Id. The plaintiff also alleged that this negligence proximately caused her injuries. Id. Defendants
moved for and were granted summary judgment based on Halvorson. Id. Plaintiff appealed, and
the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial of the factual issues. Id.
129 1d. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1297. The Washington Court of Appeals based its decision on the
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therefore, that if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the host furnished alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated person, the host can be liable for injuries that are proximately
caused by that guest.'" In response to the defendant's contention that no "furnishing"
occurred because alcohol was merely made available, and the guests helped themselves
to 4, 13 ' the court stated that the manner in which the alcohol is served is of no conse-
quence. 1 S 2
 The relevant inquiry, the court noted, is who had authority to deny further
service of alcohol when the intoxication of the guest became apparent.'" Thus, under
the exception to the historical rule of nonliability established by the Washington courts
in Wilson and Halligan, a common law negligence cause of action may exist against a
social host who serves alcohol to an obviously intoxicated guest.
While the Ohio and Washington courts were willing to impose liability on social
hosts, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the 1984 landmark case of Kelly v. Gwinnell,' 34
became the first court to definitively reject the historical rule of nonliability of social
hosts. The Kelly decision was the culmination of a series of New Jersey cases which
involved social host liability. The first New Jersey case to deal with liability of social hosts
was Linn v. Rand)" In Linn, the defendant served an excessive amount of alcohol to a
minor, and negligently permitted the minor to drive her car.' 36
 While driving, the minor
ran down and seriously injured the plaintiff.'s 7
 The injured plaintiff sued both the drunk
driver and the host.. 138 Reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of the host,' 39 the Linn court rejected the view that furnishing alcohol in a social setting
gives immunity to the social host for negligence of the guests which is the proximate
Washington Supreme Court's recent interpretation of Halvorson as recognizing an exception to the
traditional rule of nonliability. Id. See supra notes 112, 119 and accompanying text.
'" Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1297. The court determined that the plaintiff
had created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the guest was furnished alcohol while obviously
intoxicated. Id. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1297-98. The court ruled, therefore, that summary judgment
should not have been granted. Id. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1298. The court found that the deposition of
another guest at the party created a genuine issue of fact. Id. The deposition stated that the guest
was unsteady on his feet and totally obnoxious when he made a presentation before the other
guests, and that after the speech he continued to drink at his table. Id.
1,1 Id.
1 " Id,
1 " Id, at 88-89, 678 P.2d at 1298.
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). For a discussion of Kelly, see infra notes 150-178 and
accompanying text.
i" 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). The Linn court relied on an earlier New Jersey
case which imposed common law liability on vendors. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959). The Linn court quoted portions of Rappaport which discussed actionable negligence,
focusing on foreseeability of harm to others and proximate cause. 140 N.J. Super. at 216-17, 356
A.2d at 18. The Linn court noted that:
[t]he forward-looking and far-reaching philosophy expressed in Rappaport should also
be applicable to negligent social hosts and should not be limited to holders of liquor
licenses and their employees .... It makes little sense to say that the licensee in
Rappaport is under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who may
be guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because he is unlicensed.
Id. at 216-17,356 A.2d at 17-18.
".1 Id. at 214, 356 A.2d at 16.
147 Id.
' 518 1d. at 212, 356 A.2d at 15.
OS Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 20.
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cause of injury to an innocent third party. 14° The court stated that a social host who acts
negligently with resulting harm to others will not be given "the special privilege of
immunity.""' While this case involved a minor rather than an adult guest, there was
nothing in the court's reasoning which indicated that the application of the doctrine set
forth by the court would be limited to minors. 12
In 1982, the New Jersey Superior Court, in Figuly v. Knoll,' 42 relied on the Linn
decision to deny summary judgment to a social host for injuries to a third person."4 in
that case, the guest attended a party conducted by the defendant." 5 The plaintiff alleged
that the guest was in attendance for over five hours, was served approximately a dozen
alcoholic drinks during that time, and became obviously drunk.' 46 The defendant in
Figuly had previously worked as a commercial bartender, and knew the guest in that
capacity.' 47 He acknowledged that he could recognize levels of intoxication in the guest,
and further admitted that the guest was an alcoholic or "close to it." 114 The court held
that a social host who furnished alcohol to any obviously intoxicated person under
circumstances which create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others may be held
legally responsible to third persons injured when that harm does occur.""
While the impact of Figuly and Linn may have been limited because they were
decisions of the Superior Court, in the 1984 case of Kelly v. Cwinnell' 50 the New Jersey
Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether a social host can be held liable under
common law negligence for serving alcohol to . an obviously intoxicated adult guest. In
Kelly the guest spent an hour or two at the defendant's home, during which time he
consumed two or three alcoholic drinks. 15 ' Defendant then accompanied his friend to
his car, talked with him, and watched as he drove off toward his home.' 52 About twenty-
five minutes after the guest left, the host telephoned his home to make sure he had
arrived safely.'" On the way home, however, the guest was involved in a head on collision
with a car driven by the plaintiff, who was seriously injured.'" After the accident a blood
alcohol test indicated that the guest's blood alcohol concentration was .286%.' 55 The
plaintiff sued the guest and the hosts.' 56 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
", Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19. The New Jersey courts have not hesitated to place responsibility
on a person committing a tortious act, the Linn court noted, and have changed old common law
doctrines that grant wrongdoers immunity. Id. at 217-18, 356 A.2d at 18.
' 41 id. at 217-18, 356 A.2d at 18.
142 See Figuly, 185 N.J. Super. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565.
' 45 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (1982).
' 44 Id. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565.




"9 Id. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565.
'" 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).




1 " Id. The plaintiff's expert witness concluded that the guesi had actually consumed the
equivalent of thirteen drinks, and must have been severely intoxicated while at the defendant's
home. Id.
,56 Id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220. The defendants moved for, and were granted, summary
judgment, contending that as a matter of law social hosts are not liable for the negligence of an
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Superior Court decision which had affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor
of the hosts. 157 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a host who serves alcohol to
an adult guest whom the host knows is already intoxicated and will soon be driving, is
liable for injuries to a third party as a result of the guest's negligent driving when that
negligence is caused by the intoxication. 158
The Kelly court began its decision by stating that a conventional negligence analysis
would lead to a finding of liability against a social host. 159
 The court stated that a
reasonable person in the host's position could foresee that continuing to serve alcohol
to his guest would make it more likely that the guest would drive his car negligently. 160
The court further noted that the host could also foresee that if he kept serving the
guest, someone else was likely to get injured as a result of the guest's negligent driving. 16 '
Hence, the court noted, the usual elements of a negligence cause of action were present
in this case.' 62 The only question that had to be considered, the court concluded, was
whether a duty to prevent the risk existed. 163
In its analysis of the duty issue, the Kelly court relied on public policy considera-
tions.'" The court stated that the policy considerations served by imposing the duty far
outweigh the considerations asserted in opposition. 165
 Imposing a duty on the social host,
adult guest who becomes intoxicated while at the host's home. Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1220-21,
The Appellate Division affirmed, and noted that common law liability had been extended to a social
host only when the guest was a minor. Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
"7 Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230.
158 Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224, The court emphasized three times throughout the opinion
that the holding is limited to the facts of the case. Id. at 556, 559, 476 A.2d at 1228, 1230.
'" Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221. See Davis v. Sam Goody, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 423, 425, 480
A.2d 212, 213 (1984). The Davis court cited Kelly and stated that liability in New Jersey depends
not on the nature or character of the supplier of alcohol nor on whether the tortfeasor is a minor
or adult, but on the conventional negligence analysis respecting foreseeability. Id. The Davis court,
therefore, reversed the determination of the trial judge denying, as a matter of law, "vicarious
liability for alcohol consumption." Id.
' 8° Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
161 Id.
' 62 Id. The host's actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. That risk was
clearly foreseeable, and resulted in an injury that was just as foreseeable. Id. For elements of a
common law negligence cause of action, see supra note 11.
' 63 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
164 Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. The court stated that:
[i]n most cases the justice of imposing such a duty is so clear that the cause of action
in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor's creation of an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. In fact, however, more is
needed, "more" being the value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy, that
the actor owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care .... [W]hether a duty
exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the
proposed solution.
Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Before dealing with specific policy arguments, the Kelly court discussed the progression of the
law in New Jersey. Id. at 545-47, 476 A.2d at 1222-24. The court noted that the considerations
against liability involved in Kelly were also present in Linn. Id. at 546-47, 476 A.2d at 1223. These
considerations included the fact that the furnishing of alcohol occurred in a social setting, not a
tavern; that the furnisher was a host, not a licensee; and the argument that the sole responsibility
is on the drinker. Id.
165 Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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the court opined, results in added assurance that victims of drunk drivers will be justly
compensated.'f'6 In addition, the Kelly court noted that imposition of the duty is consistent
with the social goal of reducing drunk driving. 167 Although the court discussed the
concern that the potential liability of the social host may be disproportionate to the
fault,' 68 it pointed out that this concern is based on the assumption that society does not
consider a host's actions under these circumstances to be very serious. 166 Contrasting the
injury or loss of life of an innocent third party to the social host's possible substantial
economic loss, the court concluded that liability was not clearly disproportionate to the
fault." The court also addressed the contention that the issue of social host liability is
best left to the legislature."' In considering this question, the Kelly court noted that
determining the scope of a duty in negligence cases has traditionally been accepted as
the responsibility of the courts.'" Moreover, the court stated that it did "not perceive
the potential revision of cocktail party customs as constituting a sufficient threat to social
well being to warrant staying [their] hand."'"
Although the Kelly decision was a bold step in the area of social host liability, the
New Jersey Supreme Court did limit its decision to some extent. The court emphasized
' 66 id.
' 67 Id. at 545. 476 A.2d at 1222.
168 Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1225. While a vendor can "spread the loss" of liability to its customers,
the court stated that a host stands to lose everything, especially if traditional insurance protection
is not sufficient. Id. at 550,476 A.2d at 1225. The court suggested that a special form of insurance
might be designed. Id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225.
The dissent contended that even if homeowner's insurance covered this cause of action, the
premiums would probably go up as a result. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Also, the dissent noted, many homeowners and apartment dwellers have either no insurance or
insufficient insurance to cover this limitless liability, resulting in the possibility of losing everything
if found negligent. Id.
,69 Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1225.
175 Id. at 550-51, 476 A.2d at 1225.
Lit Id. at 552-56, 476 A.2d at 1226-28. The court addressed the dissent's contentions that the
court should defer to the legislature because the legislature can better devise an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, dissenting). The legislature, the dissent stated, would
have superior knowledge of the issues involved through investigation and hearings. Id. at. 570, 476
A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent also addressed the suggestion that the majority's
ruling would have potential extraordinary effects on the average citizen. Id. at 560-69, 476 A.2d
at 1230-35.
172 Id. at 552, 555, 476 A.2d at 1226, 1228.
173 Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
On February 20, 1985, a settlement of $ 72,500 was reached in the case after it was remanded
to the Superior Court. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at Al, 115, col. 2. The settlement will be paid by
the guest's automobile insurance company ($100,000), and the host's homeowner's insurance com-
pany ($72,500). Id. at B5, col. 2. The settlement was reached after the jury had been selected and
the lawyers had completed their opening arguments. Id. at Al. The plaintiff, who suffered a broken
jaw and broken ankle in the accident, said she was pleased with the settlement. Id. at Al, B5, col.
2.
The settlement reached in this case seems to weaken the argument espoused by courts in the
past for refusing to recognize a cause of action against social hosts that common law negligence
liability would be a financial burden on these individuals. See supra notes 89, 168-170 and accom-
panying text. In this case, the host's homeowner's insurance company is paying the settlement. The
concern expressed in the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly, that the host stands to lose everything
if found liable, is not relevant given the terms of this settlement. See supra notes 168-170 and
accompanying text.
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that its decision applies where the host directly served the guest after the host knew that
the guest was intoxicated."4 The court also stressed the factor that the host knew the
guest would shortly be driving. 175 The Kelly court noted that this liability is imposed
solely for the foreseeable consequences to third parties resulting from the drunken
driving. 176
 The court noted that the duty imposed on the social host evolves from the
control of the liquor supply.'" The court found that no distinction can be made, therefore,
between a vendor who profits from serving alcohol and a host who serves alcohol
gratuitously. 178
Thus, in recent years, the historical rule of nonliability against furnishers of alcohol
has been limited, so that now a majority of jurisdictions recognize liability against com-
mercial vendors. Most jurisdictions, however, still have not extended such liability to
social hosts. In 1971, the Oregon Supreme Court was the first court to recognize that a
host has a duty to refuse alcohol to a guest when that guest's characteristics, such as .
severe intoxication, make it likely that he or she will act unreasonably. 179 Although the
Oregon legislature, in 1979, statutorily defined the situations which give rise to social
host liability, it recognized that a host may be liable if he or she provides alcohol to a
visibly intoxicated guest.'" In Baird, although the Ohio Appellate Court did not reach
the merits of the case, it reasoned that liability could be imposed if the social host knew
that the guest would consume the furnished alcohol, that the guest was or would beome
intoxicated, and that the guest would create an unreasonable risk of harm to third
persons)" In Wilson and Halligan, the Washington courts stated their holding that a
social host can be liable if the plaintiff proves that the host furnished alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated guest as an exception to the historical rule of nonliability. 182 The
Washington courts have stated that the historical rule must be changed by the legisla-
ture)" Of the jurisdictions which have recently recognized that social hosts may be liable
under a common law negligence theory, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly made
the boldest move by wholly abrogating the historical nonliability rule against social hosts
who serve intoxicated guests.'"
III. ANALYSIS OF COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF SOCIAL HOSTS
The traditional rule of nonliability for those who furnish alcohol to intoxicated
persons has been under attack in recent years. A trend has developed in the courts to
abolish the historical limitations on the liability of furnishers of alcohol to injured third
"4 Kelly, 96 N.J at 556, 559, 476 A.2d at 1228, 1230.
175 Id.
'v" Id. at 559, 476 A2d at. 1230. The court. further held that the host and guest are liable as
joint tortfeasors. Id.
'" Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
L" Id. Since the control of the liquor supply is the crucial factor, the motive for making the
alcohol available, the court stated, is irrelevant. Id.
179 Wiener, 258 Or. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
"'" OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.955, 30.960 (1983). See supra note 50.
' 81 Baird, 11 Ohio App. 3d at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233. See supra notes 105, 108-11 and
accompanying text.
182
 Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032; Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at
1297. See supra notes 1 19, 129 and accompanying text.
153
 Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 441-42, 656 P.2d at 1034.
189 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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parties. Today, a majority of jurisdictions recognize a common law negligence action
against commercial vendors of alcohol. In the 1980's several courts have continued this
extension of liability to social hosts under a common law negligence theory. This note
submits that the recent decisions' 85 recognizing a common law negligence cause of action
against social hosts for furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated individual dem-
onstrate that such a theory of recovery is both desirable and workable.
A. Common Law Negligence — The Most Appropriate Theo)? of Social Host Liability
A few courts have based social host liability on dram shop acts and liquor control
statutes. 188 Because some liquor control statutes and dram shop acts are not explicitly
limited to the sale of alcohol, some courts have construed them to impose a duty on
social hosts.'"' A social host who serves alcohol to a minor knows that he or she is breaking
the law, and therefore arguably should be held to a duty implied from a liquor control
statute. But dram shop acts and liquor control statutes, even if broadly worded, cannot
be extended to social hosts serving alcohol to an adult. Social hosts are not aware of the
fact that serving alcohol to an adult is in violation of a statute. 188 Moreover, courts have
noted that dram shop acts, which provide for strict liability, are penal in character and
therefore should be narrowly construed so as only to apply to commercial vendors.' 89
Due to these difficulties with a statutorily implied duty, the current view seems to be
that these statutes will not be broadly construed so as to impose liability on social hosts.'"
While some courts have construed statutes so as to impose social host liability, many
courts justified their refusal to extend liability to social hosts on the basis that the matter
is best left to the legislature. 19 ' Clearly, legislatures may and have enacted legislation
specifically dealing with social host liability.' 92 Such legislation may codify a recognized
requirement of the common law negligence cause of action,'" or may even abrogate a
judicial decision recognizing social host tiability. 194 While legislative action is possible,
185 Kelly v. Gwinneil, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477,
449 A.2d 564 (1982); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976); Baird v. Roach, 11
Ohio App. 3d 16, 462 N.E.2d 1229 (1983); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030
(1982); Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295 (1984).
' 96 See, e.g., Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Iowa 1972) (social host held liable
under dram shop act); Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262, 263-64 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiff
stated "viable theory of liability" under liquor control statute); see also supra notes 36-37, 46 and
accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 36-37, 45-46 and accompanying text.
I" See Graham, supra note 10, at 568.
199 See .supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
I" See Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 857-58, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982);
Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 239, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973); see also supra notes 38-42, 47 and
accompanying text.
19 ' Miller v. Moran, 96 111. App. 3d 596, 601, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981); Runge v. Watts,
180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (1979). See also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
192 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(D)
(1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983); see also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
193 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983). See also supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
' 94 CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985) (abrogating Coulter v. Superior Court
of San Mateo County, 29 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978)). See also supra note
48.
1270	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol, 26:1249
legislative inaction cannot be used as a justification for denying a court the power to
act.'" The historical rule of nonliability was judicially created; therefore it is within the
province of the courts to change the rule.L 96 The historical rule applied equally to vendors
and social hosts, and can similarly be rejected as applied to both. Indeed, courts have
been limiting the historical rule for years, so that now a majority of jurisdictions recognize
liability against commercial vendors. In addition, some jurisdictions have taken the step
of completely abolishing the traditional rule and have recognized such liability against
social hosts.
As evidenced by these courts' rejections of the nonliability rule, it becomes apparent
that a common law negligence theory would be the most appropriate method of holding
a social host liable for injuries to a third person caused by a drunken guest. A negligence
standard, unlike statutorily imposed strict liability, would take into account the relative
inexperience of social hosts in dealing with intoxicated individuals. Under a negligence
standard, a social host would be held to the standard of a reasonable person in the same
circumstances. The duty of reasonable care under common law negligence is one which
every person owes to society.'" 7 It is appropriate, therefore, to hold a social host liable
under such a theory.
B. Policy Arguments Concerning the Imposition of Social Host Liability
In refusing to extend social host liability, courts have stated that to recognize liability
to an injured third person would make it dangerous to have a drink with a friend.'"
The focus of the extension of liability to social hosts is not on sober friends enjoying a
single drink. Instead, the impostion of social host liability involves serving a guest who
has already had several drinks. In that situation, having a drink with a friend can be
dangerous, either to the drinker or an innocent third person injured because of such
hospitality. 19" When a host serves an intoxicated guest more drinks, and knows that the
guest will be driving soon, it is likewise foreseeable that the furnishing of alcohol will
make it more likely that the guest will drive negligently, possibly injuring or killing an
innocent third person. 20D Even courts that have not totally rejected the historical rule
have accepted this view of foreseeability. For example, although the Ohio Appellate
19 ' Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); McClennan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d
408, 415 (Wyo. 1983). See also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
196 Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 630, 651 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1982).
197 Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980); see also supra notes 62-
63, 160-162 and accompanying text for discussions of the application 01 a common law negligence
duty to social hosts.
198
 Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964).
HP' See DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1. Each case discussed in this note which involved a social
host demonstrates this danger. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220 (1984) (plaintiff seriously
injured in head-on collision with intoxicated guest); Figuly, 185 N.J. Super. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564
(plaintiff injured in car accident with intoxicated guest); Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at 214, 356 A.2d at
16 (intoxicated guest ran down and seriously injured plaintiff); Baird, 11 Ohio App. 3d at 16, 462
N.E.2d at 1230 (accident when allegedly intoxicated guests went left of center while drag racing);
Wiener, 258 Or. at 636-37, 485 P.2d at 20 (plaintiff injured in accident with intoxicated guest);
Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 436, 656 P.2d at 1031 (plaintiff-guest killed when lost control of car and
struck utility pole); Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 86, 678 P.2d at 1296 (plaintiff injured by intoxicated
guest).
2" Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222; Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501,
233 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1968). See also supra notes 59-61,80,160-162 and accompanying text.
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Court in Baird did not definitively recognize a common law negligence cause of action,
it did make the crucial recognition that the question of proximate cause should be left
to the jury. 20 ' This recognition results in treating actions between social hosts and injured
third parties like other negligence actions .202
Another argument in opposition to liability of social hosts involves the inability of a
social host to monitor her guest's drinking. This argument becomes irrelevant when it
is realized that the duty that a social host owes to her guests arises from the control of
the liquor supply. 209 A cause of action has been recognized against a retail seller, whose
control over the alcohol is analogous to that of a social host. Both individuals supply the
alcohol, but do not have the control over the consumption which a tavern keeper does. 204
The cases involving retail liquor store owners demonstrate that the control over the
supply of alcohol, and not control over the consumption, is the crucial factor in deter-
mining liability. A social host who has control over the supply of alcohol should therefore
be held responsible for negligent actions stemming from that control. As the Halligan
court noted, the manner in which the alcohol is served is not important; the relevant
concern is "who had authority to deny further access of alcohol when intoxication became
apparent." 2 °5
There is no logical reason to distinguish vendors and social hosts when determining
liability under common law negligence for furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated
person. Much of the reasoning of the courts which have imposed liability on commercial
vendors can be equally applied to social hosts. Courts which have recognized a common
law negligence cause of action against vendors and social hosts have abandoned the
historical rule that the proximate cause of the injury is the drinking, rather than the
furnishing of the alcohol:2°6 Cases imposing liability on commercial vendors have indi-
cated that the furnishing of the alcohol, not merely its sale or consumption, is seen as
• the proximate cause of a resulting injury. 207 The danger of serving alcohol to an already
intoxicated person is well known to the public at large — including commercial vendors
as well as social hosts. 202 Any furnisher of alcohol, therefore, has a duty to use reasonable
care to avoid creating unreasonable risks to others. 209
In recognizing that the furnishing of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person,
whether by a vendor or social host, can be the proximate cause of a resulting injury, the
policy arguments which courts have used for refusing to recognize social host liability
2°1 Baird, 1 li Ohio App. 3d at 18-19, 462 N.E.2d at 1232-33. See also supra notes 108-111 and
accompanying text.
202 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22. See also supra notes 62-63, 160-162 and
accompanying text.
209 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224; Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88-89, 678 P.2d at 1298.
204 Michnik -Zilbennan, 14 Mass. App. at 539-40, 440 N.E.2d at 1301-02.
2° 5 Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88-89, 678 P.2d at 1298.
2''' For a discussion of the historical rule, see cases cited supra notes 5-6 and accompanying
text.
207 See, e.g., Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska 1973) (modern view in
cases involving liquor vendor liability is that the furnishing of alcohol may be the proximate cause
of the injuries).
204 Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 631-32, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964). See also
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
209 Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980); see also supra notes 62-63
and accompanying text.
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become irrelevarit. 210 As the Kelly court noted, many of these concerns are based on the
fear of "revision of cocktail party customs." 2 " Cocktail party customs may indeed change
when social host liability is recognized, but as the Kelly court stated, that is not a sufficient
reason to warrant judicial restraint in this area. 212
The hazards of drunken driving are reported in the media nearly every day. Over
half of all fatal car accidents involve a drunk driver. 2 " As the number of drunk driving
accidents and deaths continue to escalate, it becomes apparent that placing sole respon-
sibility on the driver is not an effective solution and is not serving as a deterrent:2 "
Furthermore, because injury to a third party is a foreseeable result of furnishing alcohol
to an obviously intoxicated individual,m it is unfair to the injured party to immunize
the host from liability.
The traditional rule of nonliability operates to exclude one class of risk producers,
the social hosts. This rule leaves the innocent victim with an action against only the
driver, who is often inadequately insured. 210 The justification for recognizing a common
law negligence cause of action is that an individual acts negligently in serving alcohol to
an obviously intoxicated person. When that negligence results in injury to an innocent
third person, therefore, the social host should be treated like any other negligent actor
and held accountable. As the Kelly court noted, imposing liability on social hosts will not
only result in added assurance that the victims of drunk drivers will be justly compen-
sated?" but it is also consistent with society's goal of reducing drunk driving. 2 °
C. Proposal for the Extension of Common Law Negligence Liability to Social Hosts
Since it is apparent that a common law negligence theory of liability against social
hosts is desirable, this note proposes the adoption of a negligence standard which would
find a social host liable when he or she serves alcohol to an intoxicated person, under
circumstances where a reasonable person would have stopped serving the guest in the
same or similar situation. In such a case, a social host would be treated like a defendant
in a typical negligence case. As in other negligence cases, in order to recover against a
social host, an injured plaintiff will have to prove the four traditional elements of a
negligence cause of action — duty, breach, causation and harm. 2 " This will require that
the plaintiff show that the host served alcohol to the guest in a situation where the host
knew or should have known that the guest was intoxicated and would later be driving. 220
The plaintiff must further prove that this furnishing was done under such circumstances
21 " Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544-51, 476 A.2d at 1222-25.
2 " Id. at 554-55, 476 A.2d at 1227.
2 ' 2 Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227. The Kelly court recognized that if the legislature did not agree
with its ruling, it could override the decision by statute. Id.
213 See DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1.
214 Over the past ten years, an average of 25,000 people have been killed each year by drunk
drivers. DRUNK DRIVING, supra note I.
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22. See also supra notes 59-61, 158-162 and
accompanying text.
2 ' 6 Note, Liability of Commercial Vendor of Alcohol-Duty Derived from Violation of Criminal Statute, 22
Dug, L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1984).
212 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
218 Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
212 Note, Injuries in Furnishing Liquor, supra note 11, at 293 n.70. See also supra note 11.
22° Note, Injuries in Furnishing Liquor, supra note 11, at 293 n.70.
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that a reasonable person would have stopped serving alcohol to the guest in the same
or similar situation. 221 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the guest's abilities became
impaired by the furnished alcohol so that the impairment was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. 222
It has been argued that recognizing common law negligence liability will expose a
host to unlimited liability. 225 This liability, however, is no different than the potential
liability of anyone who may act negligently, causing injury to a third person. As the Kelly
court noted, such liability is not disproportionate to the injury resulting from the host's
negligence. 224
Because the principles of strict liability are inappropriate in dealing with social hosts,
obvious intoxication of the guest must be the threshold for holding a social host liable. 225
Otherwise, a social host will be held to strict liability for any injuries which result from
a guest's drunk driving, even if the host served only sober guests. For example, the Baird
court stated that the host could be held liable, not for serving to an obviously intoxicated
guest, but for serving to any guest whom the host knew "would become intoxicated" and
create an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons. 226 While such strict liability would
likely be the surest method of achieving the broad social goals of stopping drunk driving,
this would be placing too great a burden on social hosts. As long as alcohol consumption
is accepted by society, a host is not negligent and therefore would not be held liable
when he or she only serves sober guests. Furthermore, liability for serving alcohol to a
sober guest is not in accord with the liability imposed in the majority of cases which have
recognized a common law negligence cause of action against a furnisher of alcohol. 227
While the concern that potentially every social gathering can give rise to liability228 may
be correct, this liability would only be imposed if the host acted negligently by serving
the guest when the host knew that the guest was already intoxicated, and would be
driving. 22g
As in any other negligence case, a reasonable person standard would be applied in
cases involving a social host,'" because after hearing all of the evidence, the judge or
jury will determine whether a reasonable person would stop serving a guest alcohol
under the same or similar circumstances. 23 ' It has been argued that because a social host
221
22'2 Id,
222 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 568, 476 A.2d at. 1234-35 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 550-51, 476 A.2d at 1225. See also supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
225
 Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1297, See also supra note 129 and accompanying
text.
226
 Baird, 11 Ohio App. 3d at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233, See also supra notes 110-111 and
accompanying text.
227
	 96 N.J. at 556, 559, 476 A.2d at 1228, 1230; Figuly, 185 N.J. Super. at 480, 449 A.2d
at 565; Halligan, 37 Wash. App. at 88, 678 P.2d at 1297. See also supra notes 59, 73 and accom-




v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103-04, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Gt. 1975). See
also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
229 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 556, 559, 476 A.2d at 1224, 1228, 1230; Baird, 11 Ohio App. 3d at 19,
462 N.E.2d at 1233. See also supra notes 110-1 l 1, 174-175 and accompanying text.
"" For a discussion of the reasonable person standard, see Prosser, supra note 5, at 175.
"Thilegligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do under the same or similar
circumstances." Id.
231 Id.
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does not have the experience of a vendor in determining when a person is intoxicated,
liability should not be imposed on hosts. 232 There are, however, outward manifestations
of intoxication which can be easily recognized by a host. 235 Moreover, a jury or judge in
assessing liability would certainly weigh this factor along with other evidence as to
negligence. A social host would be held to the standard of a reasonable person, not the
standard of a reasonable vendor.
The Wilson court held that sobriety of the guest can only be judged by the way the
individual appeared, and not by objective evidence such as blood tests. 234 The cases which
the Wilson court relied on for this proposition must be limited to the facts. For example,
in one case, two hours had elapsed between the time the guest was last observed by the
defendants and the time of death. 235 Furthermore, there was no evidence as to whether
he had consumed alcohol elsewhere after leaving the defendant's home. 236 In a case such
as that, it may be appropriate to contend that the objective evidence obtained at the time
of death was not indicative of how the guest appeared to the host two hours earlier. In
Wilson the court granted summary judgment because, although the attorney alleged that
the guest had a high blood alcohol level, there was no evidence to support that contention
before the court. 237 Yet, if only subjective evidence can be used, it is likely that in the
very situation in which liability would be most desirable — a one-on-one situation —
liability could be denied because the hosts, who would be the only eye witnesses, could
claim that the guest did not appear intoxicated. 2" The Kelly court was faced with just
such a dilemma. The hosts, who were also the only eye witnesses to the guest's appearance
while at their home, stated that he had had only two drinks. 239 The plaintiff's expert,
on the other hand, concluded that the guest had consumed approximately thirteen
drinks and must have been obviously intoxicated when he left the defendant's home. 24"
The expert based this conclusion on the guest's blood alcohol leve1. 24 ' The accident
occurred within twenty-five minutes of the guest's departure from the host's home 242
The court ruled that the objective evidence could be used as an indication of how the
guest may have appeared to the host. 245 Thus, as the Kelly case manifests, objective
evidence should be admissible to counter the inherent problem of proving the guest's
true appearance when the only eye witness of the guest's actions is the defendant-host.
The recognition of an objective standard will allow the jury to hear the objective evidence,
and weigh it against the testimony of the social host/eye witness. The concern that,
because alcohol affects everyone differently, objective evidence is no guarantee of how
232
	 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
2" Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 2! Cal. 3d 144, 155, 577 P.2d 669, 675,
145 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1978).
"4 Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 439, 656 P.2d at 1033. See also supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
233
	 v. Hosts of America, Inc., 94 Wash, 2d 640, 643 n.1, 618 P.2d 96, 98 n.1 (1980).
236 Id.
237
	 98 Wash. 2d at 436, 656 P.2d at 1031.
23"
	 at 438-39, 656 P.2d at 1032-33; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
2" Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
245 Id. See also supra note 155.
241 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
242 id .
243 Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
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the guest actually appeared, 244 while true, is just another factor that should be weighed
by the jury.
CONCLUSION
Drunk driving and its devastating effects are a pervasive problem in society. The
historical rule, which was developed when horse and buggy were the only mode of
transportation, was that the furnisher of alcohol was not held liable for injuries to a
third person. Legislatures and courts have recognized that this historical rule is inap-
propriate in current society, and accordingly have limited the rule. Statutes, which were
used to impose liability on vendors, however, have not developed as a viable theory of
recovery against social hosts. Common law negligence liability instead developed as a
theory to expand the liability of furnishers of alcohol. A negligence cause of action has
been increasingly applied to commercial vendors, both tavern keepers and retail liquor
store owners. Commercial vendor cases demonstrate the reasonableness of applying such
a theory to hold a furnisher of alcohol liable for injuries to innocent third persons.
Furnishers of alcohol owe a duty, as in other negligence cases, to avoid creating unrea-
sonable risks of harm to others. The consequences of giving alcohol to an intoxicated
person whom the furnisher knows will be driving are clearly foreseeable. This is true
whether or not the furnisher is deriving profit. Furthermore, retail liquor store owners,
who have the same control over the alcohol as a social host, have been held liable under
common law negligence. The differences between commercial vendors and social hosts
are irrelevant in determining whether a duty exists.
A trend has begun in the courts to recognize a common law negligence cause of
action against social hosts. Most of the courts which have recognized such a cause of
action seemed reluctant to totally reject the historical rule. Instead, these courts view
social host liability as an exception to the historical rule. The New Jersey Supreme Court
in Kelly v. Cwinnell, however, totally rejected the historical rule of nonliability of social
hosts. In reaching this decision, the Kelly court fully addressed the policy arguments
which courts had used in the past for refusing to recognize such a cause of action. The
Kelly court demonstrated that these policy concerns become irrelevant once it is recog-
nized that furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person can be the proximate
cause of an injury. These policy concerns do not justify deference to the legislature on
this issue. While the legislature can act in such an area, this fact should not restrict
judicial action. The historical common law rule was judicially created, and it is clearly
within the province of the court to alter the rule to meet society's changing needs. A
common law negligence cause of action is a workable theory by which to hold a social
host liable. As in other negligence cases, a reasonable person standard would be applied,
which would take into account the many differences between vendors and social hosts
which for so long have been used as a justification for adhering to the historical rule of
nonliability. Courts should, therefore, follow the lead of the Kelly court in recognizing
that social host liability should be imposed by the judiciary.
LADONNA HATTON
2" Id. at 565-66,476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
